

ASIAN ALLIANCES IN THE 21st CENTURY

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Asia will become the epicenter of geopolitical activity in the 21st century and the budding U.S.-China security rivalry, conditioned by deep economic interdependence, will shape the region's future. The United States has played a major role in this ongoing geopolitical shift. Washington's post-World War II Asia policy enabled a majority of Asian nations to economically develop and transition from closed to relatively open and stable societies. Asian countries achieved these goals by embracing the "liberal order," characterized by democratic capitalism, built and maintained by the United States.¹

While these achievements are foremost the result of Asian efforts, U.S. policy deserves credit on three counts. First, U.S. military forces have both commanded the global commons—which includes the sea, air, space, and cyberspace—allowing for rapid and decisive power projection in the distant Asia-Pacific theater,² and have been forward deployed in Asia, providing the security umbrella under which Asian nations could develop. Second, the U.S.-led economic and normative order was open and widely accepted by many nations. Finally, when necessary, American presidents applied pressure on Asian leaders to move away from dictatorship and political decay toward political development and democracy.

¹ This paper is based on an essay in the *American Interest* called *Networked Asia* by Dan Blumenthal which appeared in the May-June 2011 issue of the journal.

² Barry Posen uses "command" of the air, land, and sea just as Paul Kennedy uses "mastery." Kennedy distinguishes "naval mastery" from temporary, local naval superiority, or local command of the sea. See Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security*, 28:1 (2003). Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Macmillan, 1983, first published in 1976 by Allen Lane), 9.

Yet these very successes for Asians and Americans have also brought forth an irony, and new challenges to the international order. Perhaps the greatest benefactor of American policy over the years—certainly since the normalization of Sino-American ties—has been the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing benefitted from America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union as well as Washington’s decision to maintain its military predominance after the Soviet Union crumbled. Yet China, unlike its Asian peers, does not appear content with the American-made and -dominated international order. Beijing’s illiberal modernization and dissatisfaction with key aspects of the world order could imperil Asia’s relatively long peace. Simply put, PRC leaders may use the country’s newfound clout to undermine the geopolitical order. Indeed, China’s dissatisfaction and new ambition are beginning to define a security competition with the United States that in turn will reshape Asia’s future.

Understanding the source of this geopolitical competition requires understanding the sharp divergence in Chinese and American strategic goals. At a global level, the United States wants to maintain its primacy, not for primacy’s sake—indeed, some Americans are tiring of shouldering global responsibilities—but because there are no clear alternatives. Primacy is the least bad option. For Washington to retrench from primacy in a stable fashion, some country or set of countries would have to undertake the strategic tasks for which Washington is now responsible, which include maintaining peace between great powers, sustaining the open trading order, taming regional military competition, encouraging democratic capitalism, and stemming nuclear proliferation.

The Chinese government, however, has priorities other than the maintenance of a U.S.-led liberal order in Asia. Beijing is neither a candidate for the kind of benign hegemonic rule that others would find legitimate, nor much interested in aiding Washington in shouldering global responsibilities. Foremost, the country seeks to make Asia safe for the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This means building military strength to ward off external political pressure to liberalize. This strategy clearly works. As China has grown stronger (e.g., economically and militarily), Western government calls for political reform have incrementally dissipated.

Second, the CCP has tied its legitimacy to keeping China “whole”³ and reversing the legacies of the “century of humiliation.” In military terms, this means defeating any “separatist” threat within its territories or from Taiwan.

Third, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks greater control of China’s maritime periphery, particularly the East, Yellow, and South China Seas. It does so for three reasons. First, Beijing firmly believes that a great power must be able to exercise a veto over anyone seeking to operate close to its shores. Second, it wants the leverage to settle on its own terms longstanding territorial or sovereignty disputes with Japan, the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan)⁴ and many Southeast Asian nations. Finally, Beijing wants to project power into the far seas through which a commanding share of its maritime trade flows. All of these objectives are perfectly understandable: all rising

³ It is worth remembering that China may be the last remaining multinational empire. On this point, read Ross Terrill, *The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

⁴ This paper uses “Taiwan” and “ROC” interchangeably. “China” is used interchangeably with “PRC.”

powers become more ambitious. The only surprise is that anyone thought that China's trajectory would be different.⁵ Yet the fact that China's goals are understandable does not make them stabilizing. Indeed, China's military ambitions threaten America's Asian allies, raise questions about the credibility of U.S. alliance pledges, and imperil the U.S. military strategy that underpins its global primacy. In other words, China's ambitions present a challenge to U.S. national security interests.

Sino-American security competition, however, does not prefigure a new Cold War. That is too simple a metaphor to describe the new complex reality. In this great power competition, increased levels of trade and economic integration will coexist uncomfortably with an intensified military rivalry. For Washington, this mix of cooperation and competition makes the tasks of reassurance and deterrence much more difficult than during the Cold War. To uphold order in Asia, the U.S. military must deter conflict, reassure and protect allies, and when necessary, command and control the global commons to project military force.

Washington must accomplish its strategic goals while also "engaging" China. A critical piece of Washington's China strategy has been to integrate various Chinese stake-holders into the liberal order. Washington's sometime competing objectives create many dilemmas for its Asia policy. All allies want to see a strong U.S. military presence that is capable of balancing China's growing power. The enduring robust

⁵ For a sophisticated argument about why China's rise may be different than that of past rising powers, see Alastair I. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, 27:4 (2003), 5-56.

exercise and presence of American power will reassure allies such that they can continue engaging China and benefit from increasing levels of trade and regional economic integration.

In turn, while Washington needs its allies to forge stronger military postures to balance China, it does not want to create an enervating or nuclear military competition. And Washington's continued engagement of China, while beneficial to the region, also allows it to balance China's power without appearing too confrontational. Consequently, allies and partners will be much more willing to take the necessary measures to balance Beijing's power if they believe Washington's policy holds out the hope of China's "peaceful rise." This mix of strategies carries with it inherent risks and dilemmas. U.S. policymakers must be careful not to let a policy of engagement slip into one of accommodation or appeasement, which would undermine balancing efforts.

If U.S. engagement of China is not coupled with balancing, allies may question Washington's security commitments and start to change their policies, either to accommodate or to challenge Beijing with more muscular military strategies of their own—perhaps including nuclear weapons. To sum up, Washington must engage China in order to balance against it, and balance against it in order to engage it. There is no set formula for how to accomplish this set of complex tasks. Rather, it will take sophisticated statesmanship that has been absent in American foreign policy for decades.

To make matters more complicated for American strategy, China also plays a growing yet uncertain role in Washington's other regional challenges in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Unstable, nuclear-armed North Korea can threaten both South Korea and Japan with untold destruction, and should the Kim regime collapse, it is uncertain how China would respond. To the south, many Southeast Asian countries that still face insurgent and separatist threats now have the additional burden of contending with China's desire to press its maritime claims and expand its operational reach into the sub-region's maritime passageways and beyond into the Indian Ocean.

Washington has been slow to adapt to these realities. The United States needs urgently to rethink and refashion its alliance system in Asia. A system erected in Cold War days for Cold War purposes will not serve present and future ends. Three U.S. administrations over a period of 20 years have only marginally adjusted American strategy to the new Asian reality. In the fast-changing Asia-Pacific region, modest changes to U.S. strategy are tantamount to failure. This failure is understandable; after all, nothing breeds failure like success. Yet to admit that it is understandable is not to say that the current strategy is sustainable.

The Cold War-era "hub and spoke" model for security in Asia needs to change. U.S. preeminence depends upon Washington's continued ability to command the global commons, an imperative that enables all other military tasks—from humanitarian relief to regional deterrence to war winning responsibilities. To borrow a term from Barry Posen's seminal description of American military strategy, the Chinese military is creating "contested zones" designed to keep U.S. forces out. China's military

modernization also poses a challenge to the U.S. “strategy of command” in the space and cyber commons—a development that puts U.S. primacy at risk in other regions of the world. Furthermore, the geography of China’s “contested zones” encompasses many U.S. allies and partners and critical waterways. These contested zones will shield China against American power and allow Beijing to coerce anyone within them.

To meet these challenges the United States must develop more capabilities to regain command of the global commons and operate in the contested zones. Now, more than ever, the U.S. military needs the help of its allies to secure their common interests. Because it will take time for the U.S. military to fight its way into the contested zones during a conflict, the foremost task for the allies will be to develop their own contested zones to keep Chinese forces at bay. Second, the allies will have to provide enabling capabilities to help the U.S. project its overbearing power into areas that China’s military can contest. Finally, all allies will have to assist each other more—in particular, they need “point-to-point” arrangements to replace the hub-and-spoke.

Security Strategy and the Alliance System

The “hub and spoke” model was primarily based on a system of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Washington also has enjoyed a non-allied but close security partnership with the ROC on Taiwan (formerly a formal alliance partner), Singapore and, at times, Indonesia. With the exception of Australia, which has a world-class military of its own, the allies assume the same basic bargain: They provide bases and ports for the U.S. military and contribute generously to

supporting their presence. Some allies also provide forces in support of U.S. conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and, earlier, Vietnam. In return, America provides deterrence and defense. This model worked.⁶

As a result of this bargain and the U.S. global military strategy of “commanding the commons,” the U.S. military was able to quickly react to crises from its forward bases and reinforce its power ashore in Asia from the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Perhaps most important, U.S. policy guarantees that Washington will respond should a treaty ally be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Moreover, post-World War II alliance strategy has not only contributed to peace, stability, and growth in Asia, it has also helped forestall the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Japan and elsewhere. In some cases, such as Australia and Singapore, U.S. partners have taken the lead in making the region more secure. In other cases, particularly with capable allies such as South Korea and Japan, the U.S. government has negotiated a limited division of military labor. While Washington provides the ultimate deterrence, Japan conducted high-level anti-submarine operations during the Cold War (and to a lesser extent today), and South Korea carries a heavy burden of defending itself against an invasion. Australia is *sui generis* in Asia: not only does it provide for its own defense, but it is also a net contributor to global and regional security. Canberra has fought alongside the United States in every major conflict since World War I, and secures its immediate

⁶ Moreover, as Victor Cha has argued, the purpose of the alliance system was also to restrain allies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from enmeshing the United States in unwanted Cold War conflicts with China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security* 34: 3 (Winter 2009/10).

periphery in the South Pacific and Indonesian seas—which sometimes has meant forceful intervention.

Yet, America’s other Asian relationships are more one-dimensional: Taiwan is primarily concerned with acquiring U.S. arms and “services”; the Jakarta-Washington relationship has been too fickle to establish any real pattern of cooperation; and, since the 1992 U.S. military withdrawal from Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, the alliance with Manila has mostly been about modestly supporting Filipino counter-terrorism forces—though with Chinese aggressive actions in the South China Sea that may be changing.

Potential new partners such as India and Vietnam wait in the wings, but, as of yet, neither New Delhi nor Hanoi nor Washington know how to cooperatively focus their strategic energies. And, in the case of India, New Delhi’s desire for strategic cooperation with Washington remains uncertain. Washington’s alliance relationships are thus an uneven mix of periodic high-end cooperation, unrealized potential, and ambiguity about what either side would do in any given contingency.

While the “hub and spoke” model was ambiguous by design, allowing the United States (the “hub”) and the allies (the “spokes”) flexibility of response, the challenge posed by China’s military rise puts a premium on clarity. When the “hub and spoke” system was fashioned, it made sense for two reasons. First, fledgling nations in the region feared a resurgent Japan and were nervous about allowing Taiwan and South Korea the flexibility to start wars. And second, the power differential between

Washington and all of its allies was so great that Asian leaders were, for the most part, content leaving the United States to choose when and how to respond to aggression. Washington did not push for collective security the way it had in Europe.⁷ Now, however, the alliances need to be tied into a collective network that allows them to act quickly and effectively alone and together, with or without the United States.⁸

The need for speed and clarity in this case derives from the PLA's formidable military arsenal. And there is also no longer a real need for Washington to restrain its allies. Japan and South Korea are prosperous democratic allies who, rather than needing restraint, need to strengthen their military postures. To the extent there still are historical suspicions directed at Japan, embedding Tokyo in a collective security arrangement could do what NATO did for Germany—allow it to abandon pacifism without stirring regional fears. Taiwan has renounced the use of force against China. And while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may still bicker over territory and status hierarchies, the real problem for the institution is not enough rather than too much security.⁹ Many member states of ASEAN lack the simple ability to control their air, sea, and cyber space.

⁷ See Christopher M. Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, 56:3 (Summer 2002).

⁸ See Randall Schriver and Tiffany Ma, *The Next Step in Japan-NATO Cooperation*, Project 2049 Institute, http://project2049.net/documents/next_steps_in_japan_nato_cooperation_schriver_ma.pdf.

⁹ Jim Thomas, "From Protectorates to Partnerships," *The American Interest*, May-June 2011.

Challenging U.S. Military Strategy: PLA Contested Zones and Coercion

The necessity of re-thinking U.S. alliances derives foremost from the remarkable pace of Chinese military modernization. The PLA has built a lethal arsenal of missile and aerospace forces, surface and sub-surface forces, and electronic and information warfare capabilities enabled by sophisticated space and cyber assets. The Chinese military now threatens America's capacity to respond quickly from forward bases that are reinforced by assets sailing through and flying above the oceans.

The PLA's missiles and aircraft, enabled by targeting and reconnaissance and intelligence satellites, may be able to ground forward-deployed U.S. forces, and its submarine and mine force can target and sink U.S. surface ships trying to reach or embark from allied ports. As China's undersea force pushes into the Pacific and its long-range precision strike capabilities improve, Washington's command of that ocean—the ability to “control its every wave,” as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk once put it—is no longer assured. Losing the ability to command the Pacific would be a major change in the historic balance of power—it has been a U.S. lake since 1945. Likewise, China's space and cyber space forces imperil Washington's command of those new domains of warfare. While Washington has never enjoyed the same “command” of cyber and space and has avoided deploying weapon systems that would provide it with space control, the United States enjoys far more use of space for military purposes than any other nation. China's anti-satellite weapons put at risk U.S. dominance of space.

More specifically, the PRC is creating “contested zones” in air, sea and space.¹⁰ The PLA can complicate U.S. air operations through its integrated air defense system (IADS), which combines communications networks, early warning radars, signals intelligence, and medium surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. As Posen points out, U.S. airpower doctrine has relied on using technological advantages to suppress integrated air defenses by jamming radars and communications, by targeting SAMS with missiles, and by attacking communications nodes.¹¹

Yet conventional U.S. and allied air assets could only safely enter Chinese airspace after suppressing Chinese air defenses. U.S. suppression assets, however, are decreasing in number. A dense network of good radars and passive electronic intelligence capabilities, which the PLA has already developed, can generate a clear picture of U.S. operating activity, and thus provide early warning of U.S. attacks. The PLA air defenses may thus survive and achieve their minimum objective—thinning out U.S. attacks.

The PLA has created a contested zone at sea as well. China’s sea-denial capability in littoral combat combines all the elements Posen describes as necessary for a “contested zone”: bottom mines; diesel electric submarines; small, fast, surface attack craft; surveillance radars; electronic intelligence; long-range, mobile, land-based SAMs;

¹⁰ Posen, *Command of the Commons*, 22-24.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

and long-range, mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles, as well as aircraft and helicopters.¹²

PLA anti-ship missiles might prove as difficult to neutralize. It is worth remembering that a land-based, French-built Exocet badly damaged a British destroyer during the 1982 Falklands War.¹³ Anti-ship missiles fired from surface vessels and aircraft have damaged or sunk several large naval vessels.¹⁴ Finally, modern diesel-electric submarines are extremely difficult to catch.¹⁵ Bottom mines are difficult to find and disable when anti-mining assets are not under threat of attack. If the minefield is covered by fire and lies within range of shore-based anti-ship missiles, it may be impossible.¹⁶

The iconic American military response to a crisis in Asia—seared into the region’s recent memory—was the steaming of ships from Yokosuka in Japan to the waters around Taiwan in 1996 to force China to halt its missile tests over the Taiwan Strait. The action reassured most allies and infuriated Beijing. There are many more examples of this American approach to Asian security, including most recently a series of exercises in the Yellow Sea aimed at deterring North Korean aggression. Indeed, former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair observed that the U.S. military has consistently

¹² Ibid., 37.

¹³ Ibid., 38.

¹⁴ Air-launched Exocets sank the British destroyer *Sheffield* and the containership *Atlantic Conveyor* in the 1982 Falklands War. See Posen, *Command of the Commons*, 39.

¹⁵ Hunting for diesel electric submarines in coastal waters is rendered difficult by the poor acoustical transmission properties of shallow water and the background noise of coastal traffic. See Posen, *Command of the Commons*, 40.

¹⁶ Ibid., 40. On the PLA’s mining capability, see also Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability,” *Naval War College China Maritime Study* 3, August 2009.

projected power into Asia, whether to fight in Korea and Vietnam, reflag vessels in the Indian Ocean, halt a coup attempt in the Philippines, conduct a massive humanitarian response in Indonesia, or conduct a series of annual exercises that “have made the American military part of the region’s geopolitical fabric.”¹⁷

Given the advances in Chinese military capabilities described above, however, we ought to be less sanguine that we can stage a sequel to the 1996 performance in the Taiwan Strait. The PLA may be increasingly confident in its ability to not only strike a fatal blow to the ROC’s defenses before Washington could respond, but could also target ports of embarkation in Japan and U.S. ships on their way to defend the island. If current trends continue, our ability to deter and reassure in the other ways Admiral Blair has described may be at risk. As it grows ever more capable, the PLA may neither allow the United States to use its forward presence with impunity nor permit the U.S. military to reinforce its forward posture from the Pacific. American military action in Asia will carry much higher risks for U.S. forces and for countries that serve as enablers of U.S. power. To make matters worse, the risks of nuclear escalation will grow as China gains first-strike conventional supremacy along its littoral. If China can strike a devastating blow against all U.S. and allied assets in the so-called “first island chain,” U.S. response options will be highly escalatory—to include long range conventional strikes against a nuclear-armed China. It would be imprudent to assume that China will strictly adhere to its stated no first use nuclear policy in the face of devastating conventional strikes on its territory.

¹⁷ Dennis Blair, “Military Power Projection in Asia,” eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo and Andrew Marble, *Strategic Asia 2008: Challenges and Choices* (National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2008).

All U.S. allies are aware of these changes, but there has been no coalition strategic dialogue, let alone plans for coordinated responses. Instead, each ally has begun to independently modernize its military. On net this is a positive development. Most allies are modernizing their submarine fleets and anti-submarine capabilities, some are acquiring Aegis-equipped destroyers optimized for missile and air defense, improving Command, Control, Communication, Computer Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, and purchasing new fighter aircraft, ships and anti-ship cruise missiles. Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that the allies would never choose sides between the United States and China, the allies have made a choice without being asked: they are balancing against China's power.

Washington should now build upon these allied trends and knit them together. For Washington this is a unique strategic opportunity—perhaps a once in a generation chance—to refashion allied military posture to better face new challenges. No ally by itself has the power to accomplish all the strategic tasks the region now requires. And while Washington should welcome allied military modernization, it also wants to avoid nuclear proliferation and intensified regional security rivalries. Unless Washington is ready to live with both, it must remain the region's security provider. The United States just needs more help from allies than it is used to receiving.

The reassuring news is that within the next decade most U.S. allies in the region will have more equipment that is interoperable with that of U.S. forces. This is a positive starting point for the formation of a more cohesive multilateral alliance. Most U.S. friends will either have fifth or fourth generation fighters—like the F-35, F-16, or F/A-

18—diesel submarines, and Aegis-equipped destroyers. The same equipment means a stronger defense-industrial relationship. For example, the work share and supply chains for the F-35 span many countries and suppliers. They will be in business together, adjusting and improving the aircraft during its long service life. Furthermore, common systems provide more opportunities to share tactics and form joint doctrine.

Oftentimes the importance of a defense-industrial relationship is either overlooked or disparaged as the dirty business of “arms sales.” For the defense establishment, a strong defense-industrial relationship builds habits of cooperation and increases the technological capabilities of all who participate in equipment programs as well as help to tailor weaponry and force structures to the needs of each country. Defense-industrial relations must become a critical piece of building new alliance relations.

The bad news is that habits of collective cooperation are minimal, legacies of distrust among several pairs of U.S. allies are strong, and concerns amongst some of those pairs over ceding sovereignty—hard won after centuries of colonialism—for the sake of a multilateral alliance are acute. Moreover, Washington itself is understandably deeply wedded to its current alliance model: it has worked beyond all expectations. No one could have imagined after the Vietnam War that Asia would have enjoyed decades of peace and prosperity. Finally, through its shrill protests and *démarches*, China has conditioned regional states to preemptively reject any proposals aimed at enhancing alliance cohesion.

Overcoming these obstacles will be difficult, but Asia's future demands nothing less. A shared strategic concept will powerfully defend shared strategic goals. U.S. allies and new partners share both negative and positive objectives. All want to benefit from economic relations with China, but none want the region dominated by Beijing. Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand all want countries to abide by the rules of the international order—customary international law of the sea, freedom of navigation, the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, and free and legal use of the global commons. Washington's allies in Asia want to enjoy their hard won independence, growing economic prosperity, and increasing freedom. Only a shared coalition approach can achieve these goals. At the grandest level, the shared allied goal should be to persuade any would-be aggressor that targeting one ally means invoking the ire of the rest. This approach will greatly enhance regional stability and reinforce the allies' ongoing political and economic efforts to create a region that no one country may dominate.

In addition, there are sound operational reasons for tighter alliance cohesion. Without Japan's support, it is next to impossible to defend South Korea or Taiwan. It would likewise be difficult to secure the passageways from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean without the assistance (or at least acquiescence) of Singapore, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia. Above all, Washington can no longer play its traditional pacifying role without help from its allies. Washington cannot expect freedom of action throughout the Pacific or maritime Asia. Furthermore, the United States needs more allied assistance in deterring conflicts and, should deterrence fail, making it to a fight in a timely manner.

Five Principles of Alliance Cohesion

Five basic principles—discussed below in the context of three realistic scenarios—can guide America and its Asian allies both to do more and do more together.

First, the hub-and-spoke model needs to give way to a “point-to-point,” or network, model of alliances and ad hoc coalition partnerships. All allies should have the means to defend themselves alone—by becoming more resilient as well as by creating their own “contested zones”—for a brief time or together for more protracted periods. If the United States cannot come to an ally’s aid immediately, other allies can. They can do so by helping to track Chinese maritime activity and, when necessary, by chasing Chinese vessels back to Chinese waters. Second, allies should be able to help ensure access to the global commons and the waterways that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans—and to dominate them when necessary. Third, allies should be able to facilitate U.S. power projection. Fourth, the U.S. government must change its mindset about what weapons systems it builds and what technology it transfers to its allies. In an era when any adversary can obtain almost any technology it desires from one of several sources, the burden of proof should fall on those within the U.S. government who would deny an ally a needed technology. Finally, with several nuclear powers as potential adversaries, the allies need to develop many options for conventional responses to aggression in order to avoid nuclear escalation.

The region’s strongest American allies—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—are already acquiring capabilities that will serve most of the aforementioned five military

objectives. Other partners such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia will be primarily concerned with either counter-coercive capabilities or defending territorial integrity.

To clarify what the allies may have to do, it is useful to explore some plausible scenarios.

Scenario One: Taiwan

While security analysts may be focusing their attention elsewhere, Taiwan will be the most likely place where the PRC begins a conflict. In peacetime, Taiwan may seem an idiosyncratic or even anachronistic American concern—left over from the history of the past century. But the situation would look very different if Taiwan were attacked. Moreover, China’s *peacetime* coercive military strategy against Taiwan can and probably will be applied to other allies and partners. Indeed, since the recent downturn in Sino-Vietnamese relations, China may have moved more missile brigades into position to target Vietnam.¹⁸

China believes that its unrelenting intimidation of Taiwan has worked. In Beijing’s perspective, not only has Taiwan been pacified but the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is close to being severed. China may attempt the same strategy to quiet

¹⁸ See Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma, “Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities under Construction in Guangdong?” *Asia Eye*, Project 2049 Institute, August 3, 2010.

other “troublemakers” in the region. In other words, Beijing’s approach to Taiwan has revealed its preferred military strategy of intimidation, thus providing the allies an opportunity to recalibrate their own defensive strategies

More importantly, it is past time for U.S. allies to continue discussing how destabilizing a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be, how best to forestall it, and how to avoid nuclear war should the Chinese attempt an invasion. In the event that Taiwan falls into China’s hands, Asia could be cut in half, the U.S. command of the Pacific would be further imperiled, the South China Sea could become a Chinese lake, and Japan would lose strategic depth. Indeed, with China’s growing basing infrastructure on Hainan Island, a few bases and ports with missile and ISR forces placed in Taiwan could begin to give Beijing control of the South China Sea.

What could the allies learn from China’s Taiwan strategy? China has built up the wherewithal to severely punish Taiwan through an air and missile campaign and maritime blockade. The PLA is developing capabilities to conduct an air and sea denial strategy against forward-deployed U.S. and Japanese forces, as well as any forces steaming to the region. Allies and partners should now have an understanding of missile and submarine centric Chinese coercive strategies, enabled by cyber and space capabilities, and what China would do to neutralize U.S. advantages. In terms of its “command of the commons strategy,” the United States is most vulnerable to threats to its command of space and cyber space. China’s arsenal of counter-space capabilities, such as direct ascent anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and lasers, could blind U.S. satellites, which serve as the enablers of effective ground operations. The United States

will need time to re-establish air and sea supremacy as well. Thus, in any Chinese coercive strategy, allied air and naval forces properly trained, working together, flying similar aircraft, and viewing a common operating picture could help the United States bring its full strike and blockading arsenal to bear. The net effect would be a boon for deterrence—China would have to suppress or neutralize more targets at more bases and more ports. The PLA would no longer have just one geographic location to worry about.

Allies also need to pay attention to Taiwan's defense requirements should the island face a PLA onslaught. Taipei will need extraordinary resilience to counter such a campaign and demonstrate that it can still govern and function economically. Taiwan will also have to show some means of hitting back against Chinese military targets using fighter aircraft, diesel submarines, artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The ability to hit back at Chinese military targets may not have profound operational effects, but when an inferior force takes on a superior one, the ability to strike back has a nontrivial strategic and psychological impact on an attacker.¹⁹ Taiwan will have to show China that it cannot bring the island to its knees through a bombing campaign alone. Taiwan will also need to take a page out of China's playbook and create air, sea, and space contested zones. It must be ready to create a sea denial barrier around the island—diesel submarines, mines, and fast attack corvettes with anti-ship cruise missiles would all be useful. Taiwan obviously needs a lethal air force as well. F-16s C/Ds can ride out the initial missile barrage in underground bunkers and then conduct air-to-air

¹⁹ See, for example, Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Army War College: 2008).

and maritime strike missions enabled by Taiwan's own C4ISR and a common operating picture provided by the allies.²⁰

To help the United States participate in Taiwan's defense, Japan needs to more heavily militarize the Ryukyu island chain, construct more airbases, harden the ones it already has and create an anti-submarine barrier to deny China access to the Pacific Ocean, where the PLA Navy would seek to interdict U.S. forces. Finally, Japan should consider deploying conventionally armed, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles of its own to retaliate in the event that China strikes the Japanese homeland. Unlike the United States, Japan is not bound by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Tokyo therefore has the same strike options available to Beijing—the deployment of mobile, survivable ballistic and cruise missiles. Should China strike a devastating blow against tactical air assets and infrastructure in Japan, Tokyo could target Chinese airfields and ISR assets with its own arsenal of missiles to thin out Chinese strikes.

With more survivable airbases and ports in Japan, the U.S. government should be prepared to send aircraft over Taiwan to conduct combat air patrols, and send small contingents of U.S. forces into Taiwan to help with the defense of the island, particularly with sophisticated battle space management and distributed ISR. U.S. and Japanese willingness to interpose themselves between China and Taiwan will be a deterrent in

²⁰ Much has been made of the threat to Taiwan's airfields as a military argument against providing F-16C/Ds. Yet the threat is comparable to what NATO faced during the Cold War, when the Soviets threatened to use nuclear weapons against allied airfields. The solution was dispersal and hardening, something Taiwan is engaged in. If U.S. administrations are really concerned about the survivability of aircraft in Taiwan, given the threat environment, the United States should consider selling Taiwan vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft or help speed up Taipei's missile programs. .

itself. While China will use its missile force to devastate the island it will have to use follow-on tactical aviation to continue to saturate the island's defenses. This means the United States will need tactical aviation assets flying from anywhere possible (the United States may have to move to a regional basing infrastructure dependent upon marine expeditionary and amphibious units that can beef-up airstrips in a conflict) to maintain air supremacy, while other assets suppress air defense and, if a U.S. president so chooses, strike mainland military targets. This scenario, if actualized, would see the United States engaged in air-to-air combat for the first time in a long time.

The United States and Japan could use their attack submarines for maritime interdiction, strikes against PLA missile infrastructure, and breaking blockades in the Taiwan Strait while mining Chinese ports to halt PLA Navy operations.²¹ The key point is that allies should develop a diverse array of responses to an attack on Taiwan before resorting to anything beyond limited air operations against the nuclear-armed mainland China. If U.S. and Japanese conventional forces make it clear that they are ready to interpose themselves between Chinese forces and Taiwan through combat air patrols, a ground presence on the island, and counter-blockade operations, then the Chinese may think twice about striking the island in the first place. For instance, preparation for swift allied action to move forces into the Strait—the rough equivalent of a “Berlin

²¹ The United States should honor commitments made under the Bush administration to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. Taiwan's requirement for diesel electric submarines has been validated for island defense, and could play a critical role in counter-blockade operations, interdicting amphibious ships transiting from mainland China in waters northwest and southwest of Taiwan, and in carrying out surveillance operations. Assisting the ROC Navy to acquire a fleet of eight to 12 boats would advance U.S. interests.

Brigade”²²—would send a clear message to China that if it attacks Taiwan it is in for a long and painful conflict.

Another option that should be available before the United States resorts to sustained strikes on China is a distant blockade of its maritime trade in the Indian Ocean or a closing off of one of the key waterways to Chinese trade. These operations can only be conducted by Japan, the United States, Australia, and India in cooperation. This form of “horizontal escalation” may get China to quit its attacks on Taiwan and Japan without the United States having to escalate its conventional responses. China is far more dependent on maritime trade than even the U.S., making it vulnerable during a conflict.

Taiwan may be China’s top priority, but Beijing has demonstrated that it is not averse to coercing other neighbors as well. Indeed, the allies should think of Taiwan as an opportunity to learn about and practice countering the many coercive strategies China is likely to employ against its neighbors. In the past two years alone, Beijing has intensified its disputes with Japan over maritime claims in the East China Sea, with Vietnam over the South China Sea, with India over Arunachel Pradesh, and with Indonesia over the Natuna Islands.

²² General Bruce Clarke ordered that from 1 December 1961 the core of the United States military presence in Berlin, the living symbol of America's protection for the people of free Berlin, would be known as the United States Army ‘Berlin Brigade’.

The strategies and capabilities required to defend Taiwan are fungible and may be applied in a variety of scenarios. For example, if Japan militarizes the Ryuku Islands and acquires greater mining, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), conventional strike, and air supremacy capabilities, Tokyo will be better prepared to resist violent attempts by China to press its claims in the East China Sea. By hardening more bases and thus enabling more airpower to be deployed over the Korean peninsula, Japan could also contribute more to the defense of South Korea. Closer coordination with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy could enable Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) to keep the sea lanes around South Korea open during a conflict in which North Korea tries disrupting them. Finally, with a robust submarine force, more Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), stealth-capable fighters, and small fast-attack boats, Japan could help keep open (or close down) access to the South China Sea and the Malacca and Lombok Straits. With these capabilities Japan could also stop the PLA Navy from entering key sea lanes in the event of a conflict.²³

Preparations by India and Australia to conduct blockades and clear the Southeast Asian maritime transit points of Chinese submarines or other vessels would enhance their strategic interests well beyond a Taiwan scenario. India does not want to see a dominant Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. With its fleet of submarines, surface destroyers, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, and C4ISR assets placed on the Nicobar and

²³ All of these Japanese activities are predicated on a successful political effort within Japan to lift self-imposed restrictions on collective self-defense, which is no easy task.

Andaman Islands, India could work with Japan, the United States and Australia to thwart any Chinese attempt at maritime encirclement or sea denial.²⁴

For Canberra, too, greater capability in sea denial, blockading and maritime strike would grant it the strategic depth and operational sanctuary it seeks.

Scenario Two: North Korea

A nuclear-armed North Korea poses an array of threats, primarily to South Korea. In certain circumstances, however, the peninsula may again turn into a great power battleground. Given that North Korean forces have recently killed South Korean soldiers and civilians with impunity, the Republic of Korea needs to restore conventional deterrence by striking back at Pyongyang. Seoul need not ask U.S. permission to conduct *low-intensity* retaliatory operations undersea, by air, or by clandestine services and special forces. Still, since Washington provides the nuclear guarantee, Seoul and Washington should discuss which moves may be too risky.

Two related scenarios require greater alliance dialogue. In the first, North Korea carries out attacks against South Korea and Japan that are much more violent than past ones. This situation will require Washington and Tokyo to cooperate in repelling invasion, responding to missile barrages, ensuring nuclear deterrence, and interdicting

²⁴ Forging a strategic partnership with India will be a long hard slog. India's nonalignment attitude dies hard. The recent decision to remove US fighters from its fighter competition is a case in point. Not only are the US fighters excellent and proven performers, the possibility of India and the U.S. and all U.S. allies operating the same equipment and developing similar doctrine was a major strategic opportunity.

North Korea's maritime trade. In the second scenario, the Pyongyang regime's collapse prompts China to send military forces into the peninsula. This scenario may require allies to send a clear and unequivocal message that they want a unified peninsula under Seoul's rule. A well-coordinated network of allies could mobilize forces in ways that demonstrate to China that certain actions will carry a heavy price.

Scenario Three: Southeast Asian Maritime Disputes

China's harassment of Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea and of Indonesian fishing boats in Indonesian waters shows Beijing's readiness to press its extravagant maritime claims. Yet even a cursory review of Chinese maritime activities demonstrates that it is no longer useful to think of Southeast and Northeast Asia as distinct strategic zones. In recent exercises of maritime muscle-flexing, the PLA Navy combined forces from its North, East, and South Sea Fleets and deployed the combined fleets throughout Asia's waterways.

Such exercises have coincided with rising tensions in China's long-running sovereignty disputes over islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea.²⁵ The fiercest arguments, which have intensified over the past year, have been between China

²⁵ Beijing claims the Paracels, the Spratlys, the Pratas, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal. China has engaged in disputes over some or all of these islands with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. There are mineral, natural gas, and oil deposits in and around these geographic areas. Many claimant nations have built military installations on many of the reefs.

and Vietnam, which officially claimed the Spratly Islands as a Vietnamese province in 1973.²⁶

The disputes now encompass commercial activities as well as fishing rights. Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels struggle over the same areas. In March 2009, China sent patrol vessels to protect its fishing vessels off the Spratly Islands, which were allegedly being harassed by the Vietnamese coast guard.²⁷ The *Yuzheng* 311, equipped with heavy machine guns, was dispatched to the South China Sea from Sanya, Hainan Island, with another patrol vessel.²⁸ On 1 April 2010, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet, escorted by two destroyers, visited the disputed Bach Long Vi Island, which is located between Haiphong in Vietnam and China's Hainan Island.²⁹ During that trip, President Triet announced that Vietnam would 'not let anyone infringe on our territory, our sea, and islands.'³⁰

At around the same time, China embarked on the first of what its official media described as "long-range naval exercises."³¹ A flotilla of six ships left their base in Qingdao and sailed through the Miyako Strait near Okinawa.³² The Japanese destroyer *Amagiri* reported seeing a *Luzhou*-class destroyer and a *Jiangwei* II frigate. Another

²⁶ For background on the South China Sea disputes, see Ralf Emmers, "Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo," Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP87.pdf>.

²⁷ IISS Strategic Comments, "Chinese navy' new strategy in action," International Institute of Strategic Studies, www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=42287.

²⁸ "China to send more patrols to Spratly Islands," *Financial Times*, March 19, 2009, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/23bf74ba-1459-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1UAEhsZnv>.

²⁹ IISS Strategic Comments.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

destroyer, the *Asayuki*, detected both a *Jiangwei* II and a *Jianghu* III frigate.³³ A Chinese tanker and a salvage vessel followed.³⁴ Prior to the ships' passing, a single Chinese *KJ-200* airborne warning-and-control system aircraft was tracked by Japanese F-15s as it flew over the Miyako Strait.³⁵ A report in the *PLA Daily* described this as a "long-distance training exercise."³⁶

A Chinese official stated that, "China needed to protect its maritime territorial integrity through long-distance naval projection."³⁷ A Chinese news report showed J-8 fighters providing long-range air cover and images of ASW exercises.³⁸ The flotilla made its presence felt as it travelled through the Miyako Strait and later the Bashi Channel³⁹ between the Philippines and Taiwan.⁴⁰ The naval vessels conducted numerous live-fire exercises with other maritime assets. The PLA reported that the fleet visited the Spratly Islands, as well as conducting further exercises near the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia.⁴¹

These exercises and demonstrations of force show that China is not content to simply declare its "core interests" in the South China Sea; it intends on using its military to intimidate others into accepting them. And, it will use the sea lanes around Japan to

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Evan A. Laksmana, "Is China failing SE Asia's test?" *The Jakarta Post*, June 7, 2010, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/06/07/is-china-failing-se-asia%E2%80%99s-test.html>.

³⁸ IISS Strategic Comments.

³⁹ The Bashi Channel is an important passage for both military and communication. Many of the undersea cables that carry data and telephone traffic between Asian countries pass through the Bashi Channel, making it a major potential point of failure for the Internet.

⁴⁰ IISS Strategic Comments.

⁴¹ Ibid.

influence events in South East Asia and vice versa. The other claimants have options. Vietnam could resist intimidation by developing its own anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and arming itself with more small surface ships and submarines equipped with ASCM, integrated air defenses, maritime strike capabilities, and missile defenses. It may also need a marine force that can carry out dislodgement operations.

While Indonesia's main concern is territorial integrity and the safety of sea lanes such as the Malacca and Lombok Straits, China's maritime forays in and around its waters are complicating Jakarta's security environment. As Japan and Vietnam have learned, Chinese forays can quickly pivot to coercion and intimidation. Before this happens, Washington should assist Indonesian efforts to develop a better picture of its sea and airspace and to protect its waters by acquiring frigates, corvettes, and maritime strike capabilities. The Indonesian Navy frigate KRI *Oswald Siahaan* test-fired a Russian-made Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile during a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean in April 2011.⁴² This test-launch marks yet another significant capability breakthrough for a Southeast Asian navy. Jakarta could create capabilities to create its own "contested zone" that no adversary may pass.

Indonesia has the potential to become the most consequential power in Southeast Asia. But even though the Obama Administration has promised to lift U.S. embargoes on arms sales to Jakarta, the process is moving at a snail's pace. Thanks to a broken U.S. security assistance system, Indonesia has not yet succeeded in acquiring such benign

⁴² Koh Swee Lean Collin, "Indonesia's Anti-ship Missiles: New Development in Naval Capabilities," *RSIS Commentaries* (2011), www.hpu.edu/CHSS/.../RSIS_Commentary_IndonesiaAntiShipMissiles.pdf.

capabilities as airlift—something that is sorely needed in a country made up of 17,000 islands.

U.S. Defense-Industrial Policy and Security Assistance

For the United States to continue to lead, it must also change its defense-industrial and technology policies. Interoperability works best when allies have similar capabilities and a common operating picture undergirding them. The United States can and should provide needed assistance in both categories, but it needs to make major policy changes for that to come to fruition. In an age when adversaries can acquire virtually any technology that they want, the balance of risks in export control has changed dramatically. Indeed, it is now riskier *not* to sell Japan F-22s or Taiwan F-16s or *not* to create a coalition-wide C4ISR program. In this new environment, the presumption about arms sales to allies and likely coalition partners should always be a “yes” unless a “no” can be persuasively justified.

The U.S. government must also be prepared to acquire and sell capabilities that allies can actually use and afford. Programs like the littoral combat ship (LCS) must be built, in part, around the needs of Asian allies. In the case of the LCS, for example, the platform should be smaller, less “gold plated,” and more agile. The United States should revisit its decision to get out of the diesel submarine business entirely, especially since all allies will operate these platforms and China’s fleet of diesel submarines constitute a great risk to U.S. Pacific forces. While the United States may not need diesel submarines itself, Washington could fashion a defense-industrial and training strategy

that contributes to building them for Asian militaries. For example, Korea's defense industry will be a major player in diesel submarines. The U.S. can team with Korea to produce the boats, thereby developing closer contact with the ROK Navy as well as learning more about the diesel-littoral operating environment.

The United States may consider expanding cooperative R&D with the region's growing defense industries. For instance, Taiwan is becoming a world leader in technological innovation, particularly in applied information and communications technology, which should be leveraged for mutual benefit. Isolation of these industries, which houses a significant reserve of defense research and engineering talent, is counterproductive for ensuring mutual security among allies and partners.

Secretary Gates' decision to put "on probation" the very short takeoff and landing variant of the F-35, which puts the platform at risk for cancellation, was also unwise. Given the new reality in Asia, in which China can cut runways with its strategic missile forces, few capabilities are needed more. There is an urgent need for new and survivable intelligence and missile defense technologies, running the gamut from smaller unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to directed-energy weapons (e.g., lasers).

The Asian arms market is one of the world's largest and it is growing. The United States has a strategic interest in cultivating and supplying this market. After all, no Asia-Pacific power benefits from Russia outranking the United States in arms sales. It certainly does nothing to advance coalition operations or enhance regional deterrence.

Conclusion

China's military modernization is rendering the American post-World War II military strategy in Asia obsolete. That strategy took a minimalist view of allies. With the exception of Australia, the United States needed partners mostly for basing and not as parts of a cohesive coalition. Yet Japan and South Korea, the best examples of the traditional American approach, are now regional powers that want and could do more to defend themselves and contribute to regional security. Both Tokyo and Seoul need the power and mindset to act more independently for their own defense, while enjoying the assurance that the United States will provide the ultimate deterrent. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea should form a trilateral alliance with the United States as the building block of a new Asian alliance network. It is worth remembering that France and England accepted Germany in NATO only a few short years after the defeat of Nazism. Decades after the demise of Imperial Japan, surely South Korea can put aside its mistrust of its neighbor and help incorporate it into an Asian alliance system. Once South Korea moves in that direction, other Asian allies will follow.

In the past there were good reasons for the U.S. "hub and spoke" model. Allies had to guess at how the United States or another ally would respond to a crisis, but this lack of definition allowed for more flexibility. Now, the need for certainty is greater as the tasks have become clearer: The allies together need to ward off Chinese and North Korean coercion; keep the sea lanes open; maintain access to the territories and waters China wrongfully claims; keep the Chinese military out of the Pacific and Indian Oceans;

and, during hostilities, have a menu of conventional defense options to keep the region free of nuclear conflict.

There are many obstacles to forming alliances that are more independent and more cohesive. To paraphrase Napoleon, soldiers need to eat soup together for a long time before they can fight together. They must build up habits of cooperation, overcome mistrust, and summon the will to ignore China's protestations (this last requirement applies to Washington most of all). U.S. leaders must change their outdated assumptions about what military equipment to make, buy, and sell to allies. U.S. military strategy needs to adjust. China's military modernization means that all will have to take more risks.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle, however, will be the U.S. temptation to pull forces "offshore" as Chinese forces increasingly come in range of U.S. forward military presence, which could lead to the erosion of U.S. military power. Nothing would do more damage to Asian security. The allies would be more tempted to acquire nuclear weapons, and the United States would find it harder to gain access to the region in times of crisis. Moreover, if Washington becomes too reliant on a long-range strike strategy, it could find itself short of options in case of a Chinese attack. Instead, the U.S. commitment and U.S. forces need to remain in place, as they did during the Cold War, but with more capable allies and a more robust force posture. At base this requires U.S. political leaders to adequately resource America's defense commitments to its allies. The massive shortfalls expected in U.S. shipbuilding, bomber, and tactical aviation programs

suggest that the United States is headed in the opposite direction. It is past time to enhance U.S. deterrence by heading off the coming strategic insolvency.

Washington's policy since the Nixon administration has been to welcome China into the international system. Beijing has accepted the invitation but, unfortunately, has also chosen to engage in a military competition with the United States that is undermining the post-World War II system from which China itself has greatly benefited. Competition need not lead to conflict. There are alternative futures that Washington has the power and influence to create for its own and its allies' common interests. Washington's greatest advantage is a set of highly capable allies. Now is the time to help these alliances become greater than the sum of their parts.

TRENDS IN SUBMARINE ACQUISITIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

COUNTRY	Y2011	PLANNED/PROJECTED	TOTAL in 2015-2020
Japan	16	6 ⁴³	22
South Korea	12 ⁴⁴	6 ⁴⁵	18
Taiwan	4 ⁴⁶	8 ⁴⁷	8~12
Vietnam	2	6 ⁴⁸	8
Philippines	0	1 ⁴⁹	1
Indonesia	2 ⁵⁰	2 ⁵¹	4
Singapore	6 ⁵²	NA	6
Thailand	0	2~6 ⁵³	2
Malaysia	2 ⁵⁴	NA	2
China	62 ⁵⁵	NA	70~75 ⁵⁶

⁴³ See National Defense Program Guidelines for FYI2011 and beyond, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kakugikettei/2010/ndpg_e.pdf.

⁴⁴ Nine diesel-electric (Type 209/1200) Chang Bogo-class and 3 Son Won-II-class Type 214 hybrid diesel-electric/fuel cell AIP vessels. See "South Korea Current Capabilities," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/skorea/index.html>.

⁴⁵ An additional 6 Type 214 boats will be constructed and delivered before 2018, which will bring the ROKN force level to 18 active conventional submarines. Ibid.

⁴⁶ While the Taiwan Navy possesses four submarines, only two are combat-operational Dutch-built diesel submarines.

⁴⁷ Recent reports suggest that Taiwan's MND may be settling for four diesel-electric submarines. See Jens Kastner, "Taiwan subs plan tests the waters," *Asia Times*, June 1, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF01A001.html>.

⁴⁸ Delivery of boats will begin in 2014. See Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, Southeast Asia's underwater bazaar, *The Jakarta Post*, July 26, 2011, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/07/26/southeast-asia%E2%80%99s-underwater-bazaar.html>

⁴⁹ Manila's "Sail Plan 2020" includes the procurement of a submarine.

⁵⁰ See "Submarine forces (Indonesia), Submarines - Submarine forces," Jane's, <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Underwater-Warfare-Systems/Submarine-forces-Indonesia.html>.

⁵¹ See "Indonesia to boost submarine fleet next year," *The Straits Times*, July 30, 2011, http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STISStory_696487.html.

⁵² See "Submarine forces (Singapore), Submarines - Submarine forces," Jane's, <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Underwater-Warfare-Systems/Submarine-forces-Singapore.html>. See also "The Archer Class Submarine," Kockums, October 28, 2010, <http://www.kockums.se/en/products-services/submarines/archer-class/>.

⁵³ See Wendell Minnick, "Thailand Looking at German Subs," *Defense News*, April 1, 2011,

<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6141379>. See "Thailand's New Second-Hand Submarines," *Defense Industry Daily*, April 20, 2011, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Thailands-New-Second-Hand-Submarines-06817/>.

⁵⁴ In 2002, Malaysia purchased two Scorpene-class boats (France). See "Malaysia departs French lawyer in submarine bribe probe," Reuters, July 23, 2011, accessed August 1, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/23/us-malaysia-lawyer-idUSTRE76MoTS20110723>.

⁵⁵ The current submarine force consists of six nuclear[-powered] attack submarines [SSNs], three nuclear[-powered] ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs], and 53 diesel[-electric] attack submarines [SSs]. See U.S. Congressional Research Service. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress (RL33153; April 22, 2011), 22, by Ronald O'Rourke, Text in: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33153_20110422.pdf.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 22, 40.

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